Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965MacGregor, Morris J.
History
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965
MacGregor, Morris J.
African American soldiers; United States -- Race relations
Attached status, so common for black units, thus weakened morale and
hampered training as Petersen well understood. Noting the favorable
attitude of the division commander, he had asked in April 1946 if it
was possible to assign the black 555th Parachute Battalion to the
celebrated 82d Airborne Division.[7-67] The answer was no. The
commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, General Devers,
justified attachment rather than assignment of the black battalion to
the 82d on the grounds that the Army's race policy called for the
progressive adoption of the composite unit and attachment was a part
of this process. Assignment of such units was, on the other hand, part
of a long-range plan to put the new policy into effect and should
still be subject to considerable study. Further justifying the _status
quo_, he pointed to the division's low strength, which he said
resulted from a lack of volunteers. Offering his own variation (p. 191)
of the "Catch-22" theme, he suggested that before any black battalion
was assigned to a large combat unit, the effect of such an assignment
on the larger unit's combat efficiency would first have to be studied.
Finally, he questioned the desirability of having a black unit assume
the history of a white unit; evidently he did not realize that the
intention was to assign a black unit with its black history to the
division.[7-68]
[Footnote 7-67: Memo, Actg, ACofS, G-3, for CG, AGF,
3 Jun 46, sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro
Units, with attachment, WDGOT 291.21 (30 Apr 46).]
[Footnote 7-68: Memo, CG, AFG, for CofS, 21 June 46,
sub: Formation of Composite White-Negro Units,
GNGCT-41 291.2 (Negro) (3 Jun 46).]
[Illustration: GENERAL EICHELBERGER, EIGHTH ARMY COMMANDER, _inspects
24th Infantry troops, Camp Majestic, Japan, June 1947_.]
In the face of such arguments Hall accepted what he called the
"nonfeasibility" of replacing one of the 82d's organic battalions with
the 555th, but he asked whether an additional parachute battalion
could be authorized for the division so that the 555th could be
assigned without eliminating a white battalion. He reiterated the
arguments for such an assignment, adding that it would invigorate the
555th's training, attract more and better black recruits, and better
implement the provisions of Circular 124.[7-69] General Devers remained
unconvinced. He doubted that assigning the black battalion to the (p. 192)
division would improve the battalion's training, and he was
"unalterably opposed" to adding an extra battalion. He found the idea
unsound from both a tactical and organizational point of view. It was,
he said, undesirable to reorganize a division solely to assign a black
unit.[7-70]
[Footnote 7-69: DF, D/O&T to CG, AGF, 24 Jul 46, sub:
Formation of Composite White-Negro Units, WDGOT
291.21 (30 Apr 46).]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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