Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965MacGregor, Morris J.
History
Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965
MacGregor, Morris J.
African American soldiers; United States -- Race relations
The White House conference revealed an interesting contrast between
Roosevelt and Knox. Whatever his personal feelings, Roosevelt agreed
with Knox that integration of the Navy was an impractical step in (p. 061)
wartime, but where Knox saw exclusion from general service as the
alternative to integration Roosevelt sought a compromise. He suggested
that the Navy "make a beginning" by putting some "good Negro bands"
aboard battleships. Under such intimate living conditions white and
black would learn to know and respect each other, and "then we can
move on from there."[3-11] In effect the President was trying to lead
the Navy toward a policy similar to that announced by the Army in
1940. While his suggestion about musicians was ignored by Secretary
Knox, the search for a middle way between exclusion and integration
had begun.
[Footnote 3-11: Ibid.]
[Illustration: ADMIRAL KING AND SECRETARY KNOX _on the USS Augusta_.]
The general public knew nothing of this search, and in the heightened
atmosphere of early war days, charged with unending propaganda about
the four freedoms and the forces of democracy against fascism, the
administration's racial attitudes were being questioned daily by civil
rights spokesmen and by some Democratic politicians.[3-12] As protest
against the Navy's racial policy mounted, Secretary Knox turned once
again to his staff for reassurance. In July 1941 he appointed a
committee consisting of Navy and Marine Corps personnel officers and
including Addison Walker, a special assistant to Assistant Secretary
Bard, to conduct a general investigation of that policy. The committee
took six months to complete its study and submitted both a majority
and minority report.
[Footnote 3-12: Memo, W. A. Allen, Office of Public
Relations, for Lt Cmdr Smith, BuPers, 29 Jan 42,
BuPers QN/P-14, BuPersRecs.]
The majority report marshaled a long list of arguments to prove that
exclusion of the Negro was not discriminatory, but "a means of
promoting efficiency, dependability, and flexibility of the Navy as a
whole." It concluded that no change in policy was necessary since
"within the limitations of the characteristics of members of certain
races, the enlisted personnel of the Naval Establishment is
representative of all the citizens of the United States."[3-13] The
majority invoked past experience, efficiency, and patriotism to
support the _status quo_, but its chorus of reasons for excluding
Negroes sounded incongruous amid the patriotic din and call to colors
that followed Pearl Harbor.
[Footnote 3-13: Ltr, Chief, BuNav, to Chmn, Gen Bd,
22 Jan 42, sub: Enlistment of Men of Colored Race
in Other Than Messman Branch, Recs of Gen Bd,
OpNavArchives.]
[Illustration: CREW MEMBERS OF USS ARGONAUT _relax and read mail,
Pearl Harbor, 1942_.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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