International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Philosophy
International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Conference proceedings; Medicine -- Congresses; Science and the humanities -- Congresses; Technology -- Congresses
The physicist, we said, speaks of the world of objects in so far as they
belong to every possible subject, and are material for a merely passive
spectator. Of course the pure experience does not offer us anything of
that kind. We insisted that the objects of our real life are objects of
our will and of our attitudes, and are at the same time undifferentiated
into the physical things outside of us and the psychical ideas in us. To
reach the abstraction of the physicist, we have thus to cut loose the
objects from our will and to separate the over-individual elements from
the individual elements. Both transformations are clearly demanded by
our logical aims. As to the cutting loose from our will, it means
considering the object as if it existed for itself, as if it were a mere
passively given material and not a material of our personal interests.
But just that is needed. We want to find out how far we have to submit
ourselves to the object. If we want to live our life, we must adjust our
attitudes to things, and, as we know our will, we must seek to
understand the other factor in the complex experience, the object of our
will, and we must find out what it involves in itself. But we do not
understand the object and the submission which it demands if we do not
completely understand its relation to our desires. Our total submission
to the thing thus involves our acknowledgment of all that we have to
expect from it. And although the real experience is a unity of will and
thing, we have thus the most immediate interest in considering what we
have to expect from the thing in itself, without reference to our will.
That means finding out the effects of the given object with a subject as
the passive spectator. We eliminate artificially, therefore, the
activity of the subject and construct as presupposition for this circle
of knowledge a nowhere existing subject without activity, for which the
thing exists merely as a cause of the effects which it produces.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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