International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Philosophy
International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Conference proceedings; Medicine -- Congresses; Science and the humanities -- Congresses; Technology -- Congresses
The second result still more directly concerns a philosophical logic. It
is this: Since the few types of relations which this sort of analysis
reveals as the fundamental ones in exact science are of such importance,
the logic of the present day is especially required to face the
questions: _What is the nature of our concept of relations?_ What are
the various possible types of relations? Upon what does the variety of
these types depend? What unity lies beneath the variety?
As a fact, logic, in its modern forms, namely, first that symbolic logic
which Boole first formulated, which Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his pupils
have in this country already so highly developed, and which Schroeder in
Germany, Peano's school in Italy, and a number of recent English writers
have so effectively furthered--and secondly, the logic of scientific
method, which is now so actively pursued, in France, in Germany, and in
the English-speaking countries--this whole movement in modern logic, as
I hold, is rapidly approaching _new solutions of the problem of the
fundamental nature and the logic of relations_. The problem is one in
which we are all equally interested. To De Morgan in England, in an
earlier generation, and, in our time, to Charles Peirce in this country,
very important stages in the growth of these problems are due. Russell,
in his work on the _Principles of Mathematics_ has very lately
undertaken to sum up the results of the logic of relations, as thus far
developed, and to add his own interpretations. Yet I think that Russell
has failed to get as near to the foundations of the theory of relations
as the present state of the discussion permits. For Russell has failed
to take account of what I hold to be the most fundamentally important
generalization yet reached in the general theory of relations. This is
the generalization set forth as early as 1890, by Mr. A. B. Kempe, of
London, in a pair of wonderful but too much neglected, papers, entitled,
respectively, _The Theory of Mathematical Form_, and _The Analogy
between the Logical Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of
Points_. A mere hint first as to the more precise formulation of the
problem at issue, and then later as to Kempe's special contribution to
that problem, may be in order here, despite the impossibility of any
adequate statement.
III
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