is assuredly without warrant; yes, without excuse. In fact, it is because Kant sees that the third Idea, as reached through his analysis, is intrinsically immanent,--resident in the self that syllogizes disjunctively, and, because so resident, incapable of passing the bounds of possible experience,--while he also sees that the idea of God should mean a Being transcendent of every other thinker, himself a distinct individual consciousness, though not an empirically limited one,--it is, I say, precisely because he sees all this, that he pronounces the Idea, though named with the name of God, utterly without pertinence to indicate God's existence, and so enters upon that part of his Transcendental Dialectic which is, in chief, directed to exposing the transcendental illusion involved in the celebrated Ontological Proof. Consistently, Kant in this famous analytic of the syllogism should be talking, not of the Soul, the World, and God, but of the Subject (as uniting-principle of its sense-_perceptions_), the Object (as uniting-principle of all possible sense-_percepts_), and the Self (the whole _I_ presiding over experience in both its aspects, as these are discriminated in Time and Space). By what rational title--even granting for the sake of argument that they are the genuine postulates of categorical and of conditional syllogizing--can this Subject and this Object, these correlate factors in the Self, rank as Ideas with the Idea of their conditioning Whole--the Self, that in its still unaltered identity fulfills, in Practical Reason, the high rôle of Person? If _this_ no more than meets the standard of Idea, how can _they_ meet it? How can two somethings, neither of which is the Totality of Conditions, and both of which are therefore in fact conditioned, deserve the same title with that which is intrinsically the Totality of Conditions, and, as such, unconditioned? To call the conditioned and the unconditioned alike Ideas is a confounding of dignities that Pure Reason should not tolerate, whether the procedure be read as a leveling down or a leveling up. Distributing the titles conferred by Pure Reason in this democratic fashion reminds us too much, unhappily for Kant, of the Cartesian performances with Substance; whereby God, mind, and matter became alike "substances," though only God could in truth be said to "require nothing for his existence save himself," while mind and matter, though absolutely dependent on God, and derivative from him, were still to be called substances in the "modified" and Pickwickian sense of being underived from each other.