International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Philosophy
International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics
Conference proceedings; Medicine -- Congresses; Science and the humanities -- Congresses; Technology -- Congresses
Having determined the metaphysical point of view, the next question of
vital importance is that of its _principle_. And we may cut matters
short here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking is that
of _sufficient reason_, and we may say that a reason will be sufficient
when it adequately expresses the world-view or concept under which an
investigation is being prosecuted. Let us suppose that this world-view
is that of simple mathematics, the principle of sufficient reason here
will be that of _quantitative equivalence_ of parts; or, from the
standpoint of the whole, that of _infinite divisibility_. Whereas, if we
take the world of the ultra-mathematical science, which is determined by
the notion of _phenomena depending on underlying ground_, we will find
that the sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of _adequate
cause or condition_. The determining condition or causes of any physical
phenomenon supply, from that point of view, the _ratio sufficiens_ of
its existence. We have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the
above cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines the
kind of world the investigation is dealing with. Let us apply this
insight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics, and we will soon
conclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that does not
satisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the notion of
_inception_ and _realization_; or, more specifically, _idea_ and
_reality_. In short, the _reason_ of metaphysics will refuse to regard
its world as a mechanism that is devoid of thought and intention; that
lacks, in short, the motives of internal determination and movement, and
will in all cases insist that an explanation or interpretation can be
metaphysically adequate only when its ultimate reference is to an idea
that is in the process of _purposive_ fulfillment. Such an explanation
we call _teleological_ or _rational_, rather than merely mechanical, and
such a principle is alone adequate to embody the _ratio sufficiens_ of
metaphysics.
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