International Law. A Treatise. Volume 2 (of 2): War and Neutrality. Second EditionOppenheim, L. (Lassa)
History
International Law. A Treatise. Volume 2 (of 2): War and Neutrality. Second Edition
Oppenheim, L. (Lassa)
International law
§ 257. All war crimes may be punished with death, but belligerents may,
of course, inflict a more lenient punishment, or commute a sentence of
death into a more lenient penalty. If this be done and imprisonment take
the place of capital punishment, the question arises whether such
convicts must be released at the end of the war, although their term of
imprisonment has not yet expired. Some publicists[485] answer this
question in the affirmative, maintaining that it could never be lawful
to inflict a penalty extending beyond the duration of the war. But I
believe that the question has to be answered in the negative. If a
belligerent has a right to pronounce a sentence of capital punishment,
it is obvious that he may select a more lenient penalty and carry the
latter out even beyond the duration of the war. And it would in no wise
be in the interest of humanity to deny this right, for otherwise
belligerents would have always to pronounce and carry out sentence of
capital punishment in the interest of self-preservation.
[Footnote 485: See, for instance, Hall, § 135, p. 432.]
V
TAKING OF HOSTAGES
Hall, §§ 135 and 156--Taylor, § 525--Bluntschli, § 600--Lueder in
Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 475-477--Klüber, §§ 156 and 247--G. F.
Martens, II. 277--Ullmann, § 183--Bonfils, Nos. 1145 and
1151--Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2843-2848--Rivier, II. p.
302--Calvo, IV. §§ 2158-2160--Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1364--Martens,
II. § 119--Longuet, § 84--Bordwell, p. 305--Spaight, pp.
465-470--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 49, 50--_Land Warfare_, §§ 461-464.
[Sidenote: Former Practice of taking Hostages.]
§ 258. The practice of taking hostages as a means of securing legitimate
warfare prevailed in former times much more than nowadays. It was
frequently resorted to in cases in which belligerent forces depended
more or less upon each other's good faith, such as capitulations and
armistices for instance. To make sure that no perfidy was intended,
officers or prominent private individuals were taken as hostages and
could be held responsible with their lives for any perfidy committed by
the enemy. This practice has totally disappeared, and is hardly likely
to be revived. But this former practice must not be confounded with the
still existing practice of seizing enemy individuals for the purpose of
making them the object of reprisals. Thus, when in 1870, during the
Franco-German War, Count Bismarck ordered forty French notables to be
seized and to be taken away into captivity as a retaliation upon the
French for refusing to liberate the crews of forty captured merchantmen,
these forty French notables were not taken as hostages, but were made
the object of reprisals.[486]
[Footnote 486: The case has been discussed above in § 249. All the
French writers who comment upon this case make the mistake of referring
to it as an instance of the taking of hostages.]
[Sidenote: Modern Practice of taking Hostages.]
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