Introduction to Mathematical PhilosophyRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand
Mathematics -- Philosophy
What we have said just now as regards the definition of
classes is sufficient to satisfy our first four conditions. The
way in which it secures the third and fourth, namely, the possibility
of classes of classes, and the impossibility of a class being
or not being a member of itself, is somewhat technical; it is
explained in Principia Mathematica, but may be taken for
granted here. It results that, but for our fifth condition, we
might regard our task as completed. But this condition—at
once the most important and the most difficult—is not fulfilled
in virtue of anything we have said as yet. The difficulty is
connected with the theory of types, and must be briefly discussed.[42]
[42]The reader who desires a fuller discussion should consult Principia
Mathematica, Introduction, chap. II.; also * 12.
We saw in Chapter XIII. that there is a hierarchy of logical
types, and that it is a fallacy to allow an object belonging to
one of these to be substituted for an object belonging to another.
[Pg 188]
Now it is not difficult to show that the various functions which
can take a given object as argument are not all of one type.
Let us call them all -functions. We may take first those among
them which do not involve reference to any collection of functions;
these we will call "predicative -functions." If we now proceed
to functions involving reference to the totality of predicative
-functions, we shall incur a fallacy if we regard these as of the
same type as the predicative -functions. Take such an everyday
statement as " is a typical Frenchman." How shall
we define a "typical" Frenchman? We may define him as
one "possessing all qualities that are possessed by most French
men." But unless we confine "all qualities" to such as do not
involve a reference to any totality of qualities, we shall have to
observe that most Frenchmen are not typical in the above sense,
and therefore the definition shows that to be not typical is
essential to a typical Frenchman. This is not a logical contradiction,
since there is no reason why there should be any typical
Frenchmen; but it illustrates the need for separating off
qualities that involve reference to a totality of qualities from
those that do not.
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