Introduction to Mathematical PhilosophyRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand
Mathematics -- Philosophy
There are in every language some words whose sole function is
to indicate form. These words, broadly speaking, are commonest
in languages having fewest inflections. Take "Socrates is
human." Here "is" is not a constituent of the proposition,
but merely indicates the subject-predicate form. Similarly
in "Socrates is earlier than Aristotle," "is" and "than"
merely indicate form; the proposition is the same as "Socrates
precedes Aristotle," in which these words have disappeared
and the form is otherwise indicated. Form, as a rule, can be
indicated otherwise than by specific words: the order of the
words can do most of what is wanted. But this principle
must not be pressed. For example, it is difficult to see how we
could conveniently express molecular forms of propositions
(i.e. what we call "truth-functions") without any word at all.
We saw in Chapter XIV. that one word or symbol is enough for
this purpose, namely, a word or symbol expressing incompatibility.
But without even one we should find ourselves in difficulties.
This, however, is not the point that is important for
our present purpose. What is important for us is to observe
that form may be the one concern of a general proposition,
even when no word or symbol in that proposition designates
the form. If we wish to speak about the form itself, we must
have a word for it; but if, as in mathematics, we wish to speak
about all propositions that have the form, a word for the form
will usually be found not indispensable; probably in theory it
is never indispensable.
Assuming—as I think we may—that the forms of propositions
can be represented by the forms of the propositions in which
they are expressed without any special word for forms, we should
arrive at a language in which everything formal belonged to
syntax and not to vocabulary. In such a language we could
express all the propositions of mathematics even if we did not
know one single word of the language. The language of mathematical
[Pg 200]
logic, if it were perfected, would be such a language.
We should have symbols for variables, such as "" and ""
and "," arranged in various ways; and the way of arrangement
would indicate that something was being said to be true of
all values or some values of the variables. We should not need
to know any words, because they would only be needed for giving
values to the variables, which is the business of the applied
mathematician, not of the pure mathematician or logician.
It is one of the marks of a proposition of logic that, given a
suitable language, such a proposition can be asserted in such a
language by a person who knows the syntax without knowing
a single word of the vocabulary.
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