Introduction to Mathematical PhilosophyRussell, Bertrand
Philosophy
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand
Mathematics -- Philosophy
THE definition of cardinal numbers which we gave in Chapter II.
was applied in Chapter III. to finite numbers, i.e. to the ordinary
natural numbers. To these we gave the name "inductive
numbers," because we found that they are to be defined as
numbers which obey mathematical induction starting from 0.
But we have not yet considered collections which do not have an
inductive number of terms, nor have we inquired whether such
collections can be said to have a number at all. This is an
ancient problem, which has been solved in our own day, chiefly
by Georg Cantor. In the present chapter we shall attempt to
explain the theory of transfinite or infinite cardinal numbers as
it results from a combination of his discoveries with those of
Frege on the logical theory of numbers.
It cannot be said to be certain that there are in fact any infinite
collections in the world. The assumption that there are is what
we call the "axiom of infinity." Although various ways suggest
themselves by which we might hope to prove this axiom, there
is reason to fear that they are all fallacious, and that there is no
conclusive logical reason for believing it to be true. At the same
time, there is certainly no logical reason against infinite collections,
and we are therefore justified, in logic, in investigating the hypothesis
that there are such collections. The practical form of this
hypothesis, for our present purposes, is the assumption that, if
is any inductive number, is not equal to . Various
subtleties arise in identifying this form of our assumption with
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the form that asserts the existence of infinite collections; but
we will leave these out of account until, in a later chapter, we
come to consider the axiom of infinity on its own account. For
the present we shall merely assume that, if is an inductive
number, is not equal to . This is involved in Peano's
assumption that no two inductive numbers have the same successor;
for, if , then and have the same successor,
namely . Thus we are assuming nothing that was not involved
in Peano's primitive propositions.
Let us now consider the collection of the inductive numbers
themselves. This is a perfectly well-defined class. In the first
place, a cardinal number is a set of classes which are all similar
to each other and are not similar to anything except each other.
We then define as the "inductive numbers" those among
cardinals which belong to the posterity of 0 with respect to the
relation of to , i.e. those which possess every property
possessed by 0 and by the successors of possessors, meaning by
the "successor" of the number . Thus the class of
"inductive numbers" is perfectly definite. By our general
definition of cardinal numbers, the number of terms in the class
of inductive numbers is to be defined as "all those classes that
are similar to the class of inductive numbers"—i.e. this set of
classes is the number of the inductive numbers according to our
definitions.
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