Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries, Vol. 2Hallam, Henry
History
Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries, Vol. 2
Hallam, Henry
Literature, Modern -- History and criticism
existence is not a perfection in itself, yet it is so in its
cause, upon account of that attribute of the entity from whence
it flows; that that attribute must of all others be the most
perfect and most excellent, which necessary existence flows from,
it being such as cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing.
But what excellency, what perfection is there in all this? Space
is necessarily existent on account of extension, which cannot be
conceived otherwise than as existing. But what perfection is
there in space upon this account, which can in no manner act on
anything, which is entirely devoid of all power, wherein I have
showed all perfections to consist? Therefore, necessary
existence, abstractedly considered, is no perfection; and,
therefore, the idea of infinite perfection does not include, and
consequently not prove, God to be necessarily existence [sic]. If
he be so, it is on account of those attributes of his essence
which we have no knowledge of.”
I have made this extract from a very short tract, called
Contemplatio Philosophica, by Brook Taylor, which I found in an
unpublished memoir of his life printed by the late Sir William
Young, in 1793. It bespeaks the clear and acute understanding of
this celebrated philosopher, and appears to me an entire
refutation of the scholastic argument of Descartes; one more fit
for the Anselms and such dealers in words, from whom it came,
than for himself.
|His deductions from this.|
91. From the idea of a perfect being, Descartes immediately deduced
the truth of his belief in an external world, and in the inferences of
his reason. For to deceive his creatures would be an imperfection in
God; but God is perfect. Whatever, therefore, is clearly and
distinctly apprehended by our reason, must be true. We have only to be
on our guard against our own precipitancy and prejudice, or surrender
of our reason to the authority of others. It is not by our
understanding, such as God gave it to us, that we are deceived; but
the exercise of our free will, a high prerogative of our nature, is
often so incautious as to make us not discern truth from falsehood,
and affirm or deny, by a voluntary act, that which we do not
distinctly apprehend. The properties of quantity, founded on our ideas
of extension and number, are distinctly perceived by our minds, and
hence the sciences of arithmetic and geometry are certainly true. But
when he turns his thoughts to the phenomena of external sensation,
Descartes cannot wholly extricate himself from his original
concession, the basis of his doubt, that the senses do sometimes
deceive us. He endeavours to reconcile this with his own theory, which
had built the certainty of all that we clearly hold certain on the
perfect veracity of God.
|Primary and secondary qualities.|
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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