Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of ViennaFreud, Sigmund
Science
Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of Vienna
Freud, Sigmund
Psychoanalysis
All that you say is undeniable and yet I do not think it justifies
either of your conclusions: that dream-interpretation as practised by us
is at the mercy of the interpreter’s arbitrary decisions or that the
inadequacy of the results calls in question the correctness of our
procedure. If for the “arbitrary decision” of the interpreter you will
substitute his skill, his experience and his understanding, then I am
with you. This kind of personal factor is of course indispensable,
especially when interpretation is difficult; it is just the same in
other scientific work, however; it can’t be helped that one man will use
any given technique less well, or apply it better, than another. The
impression of arbitrariness made, for example, by the interpretation of
symbols is corrected by the reflection that as a rule the connection of
the dream-thoughts with one another, and of the dream with the life of
the dreamer and the whole mental situation at the time of the dream,
points directly to one of all the possible interpretations and renders
all the rest useless. The conclusion that the imperfect character of the
interpretations proceeds from fallacious hypotheses loses its force when
consideration shows that, on the contrary, the ambiguity or
indefiniteness of dreams is a quality which we should necessarily expect
in them.
Let us call to mind our statement that the dream-work undertakes a
translation of the dream-thoughts into a primitive mode of expression,
analogous to hieroglyphics. Now all such primitive systems of expression
are necessarily accompanied by ambiguity and indefiniteness; but we
should not on that account be justified in doubting their
practicability. You know that the coincidence of opposites in the
dream-work is analogous to what is called the antithetical sense of
primal words in the oldest languages. The philologist, R. Abel, to whom
we owe this information, writing in 1884, begs us not on any account to
imagine that there was any ambiguity in what one person said to another
by means of ambivalent words of this sort. On the contrary, intonation,
gestures and the whole context can have left no doubt whatever which of
the two opposites the speaker had in mind to convey. In writing where
gestures are absent the addition of little pictorial signs, not meant to
receive separate oral expression, replaced them: e.g. a drawing of a
little man, either crouching or standing upright, according as the
ambiguous _ken_ of the hieroglyphic meant “weak” or “strong.” So that
misunderstanding was avoided in spite of the ambiguity of sounds and
signs.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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