Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of ViennaFreud, Sigmund
Science
Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of Vienna
Freud, Sigmund
Psychoanalysis
You are right in all the unessentials. It is true that a dream differs
from a slip of the tongue in the matter of its many elements as well as
in other points. We must take account of that in our technique. So I
suggest to you that we divide the dream up into its various elements,
and examine each element separately; then we shall have re-established
the analogy with a slip of the tongue. Again, you are right in saying
that the dreamer when questioned on the single elements of the dream may
reply that he has no ideas about them. There are cases in which we
accept this answer, and later I will tell you which these are; curiously
enough, they are cases about which we ourselves may have certain
definite ideas. But in general, when the dreamer declares that he has no
ideas, we shall contradict him, press him to answer, assure him that he
must have some idea and—shall find we are right. He will produce an
association, any one, it does not matter to us what it is. He will be
especially ready with information which we may term historical. He will
say: “That is something which happened yesterday” (as in the instance of
the two “prosaic” dreams quoted above) or: “That reminds me of something
which happened recently,” and in this way we shall come to notice that
dreams are much more often connected with impressions of the day before
than we thought at first. Finally, with the dream as his starting-point,
he will recall events which happened less recently, and at last even
some which lie very far back in the past.
In regard to the main issue, however, you are wrong. When you think it
arbitrary to assume that the first association of the dreamer must give
us just what we are looking for, or at any rate lead to it, and further,
that the association is much more likely to be quite capricious and to
have no connection with what we are looking for, and that it only shows
my blind trust in Providence if I expect anything else—then you make a
very great mistake. I have already taken the liberty of pointing out to
you that there is within you a deeply-rooted belief in psychic freedom
and choice, that this belief is quite unscientific, and that it must
give ground before the claims of a determinism which governs even mental
life. I ask you to have some respect for the _fact_ that that one
association, and nothing else, occurs to the dreamer when he is
questioned. Nor am I setting up one belief against another. It can be
proved that the association thus given is not a matter of choice, not
indeterminate, and that it is not unconnected with what we are looking
for. Indeed, I have recently learnt—not that I attach too much
importance to the fact—that experimental psychology itself has brought
forward similar proofs.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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