and commands separated from the Limerick garrison should be communicated with, and that all, if terms were agreed upon, would surrender simultaneously. Meanwhile the English and Irish officers exchanged courtesies and frequently dined together, although the French generals held aloof, for some reason that has never been satisfactorily explained. But now the ultra peace party having, in a measure, the upper hand, sought to commit the Irish army to a dishonorable and ungrateful policy—the abandonment of France, which, with all its faults, was Ireland’s sole ally. Hostages were exchanged by the two armies, those for England being Lord Cutts, Sir David Collier, Colonel Tiffin, and Colonel Piper; and for Ireland Lords Westmeath, Iveagh (whose entire regiment afterward passed over to William), Trimelstown, and Louth. Following the arrival of the latter in the English camp came the peace party’s proposals, which stipulated for the freedom of Catholic worship and the maintenance of civil rights, and then basely proposed that “the Irish army be kept on foot, paid, et cetera, the same as the rest of their majesties’ forces, in case they were willing to serve their majesties against France or any other enemy.” The Irish army, nobly chivalrous and patriotic, with the usual base exceptions to be found in every considerable body of men, was not willing “to serve their majesties” as intimated, as will be seen further along. Ginkel, who was thoroughly coached by the “royal commissioners” from Dublin, who were rarely absent from his camp, rejected the Palesmen’s propositions, chiefly because of the Catholic claims put forward in them. There is no evidence whatever that Sarsfield countenanced the policy attempted to be carried out by this contemptible faction.