Isabel of Castile and the making of the Spanish nation, 1451-1504Plunket, Ierne L. (Ierne Lifford)
History
Isabel of Castile and the making of the Spanish nation, 1451-1504
Plunket, Ierne L. (Ierne Lifford)
Isabella I, Queen of Spain, 1451-1504; Spain -- History -- Ferdinand and Isabella, 1479-1516
The reduction of such strongholds was a necessary part of the conquest
of Granada; but eight more years were to pass before the task was
completed, and the capital, whose ramparts were a series of fortresses,
was to surrender, subdued not so much by wild valour as by untiring
patience.
During these years the Castilian army lost much of its feudal character,
a transformation to be completed later, on the battlefields of Italy
under the supervision of Gonsalvo de Cordova. The levies of the
principal nobles had been the backbone of the war against the
Portuguese, and still supplied no mean contribution to the Christian
forces in the kingdom of Granada. The military retainers of the Cardinal
of Spain numbered some two thousand men, while, as we have already seen,
a combination of the vassals of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia and Marquis
of Cadiz was sufficient to make Muley Hacen raise the siege of Alhama.
This same Duke, in addition to his land forces, was able, in 1487, to
dispatch a private fleet and convoy of provisions to the royal camp at
Malaga, then suffering from famine; but the wealth and power that could
give these substantial proofs of loyalty were not without their
drawbacks. The patriotic Duke, when touched in his vanity, did not
hesitate to refuse Ferdinand’s commands as to the disposal of his
troops, exclaiming touchily: “I have brought them to his service, but
they shall go nowhere save under my command.”
The sovereigns dealt with such aristocratic independence by their usual
policy of creating a counter-balance. They had established a permanent
troop of soldiers in Galicia, paid by their treasury, to enforce the
sentences of the royal judges in that unruly province; while the natural
sequence of their employment of the Santa Hermandad for the restoration
of order was the dispatch of its well-armed bands to the seat of war.
The royal forces were further recruited by numbers of the robbers and
evildoers, who had created such havoc in Castile in the early years of
the reign. It had been impossible to punish them all, as was shown in
the case of Seville; and now a free pardon was offered to those who
would take their share in the great crusade and turn their love of
violence to patriotic use. Strict regulations prevented them from
yielding to their old habits; for the work of pillage and plunder was
kept within the bounds then considered legitimate, the women and the
camp followers who preyed upon the troops were banished; and even
gambling, a customary pastime of the soldiery and ever-fruitful source
of quarrels, was suppressed.
In addition to the troops already mentioned Ferdinand also possessed
what might be called his own private army, amounting to three thousand
men, personally pledged to his service. It consisted of vassals of the
royal demesnes led by their _adelantados_; an escort of young nobles and
knights and a royal guard of some five hundred _ginetes_, or light
horse, with an equal number of heavily armed cavalry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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