He had a few partial successes at first before Frimont arrived upon the scene. Carrascosa managed to drive some Austrians—it is all but impossible to arrive at the real figures and facts of these contests, but I should be inclined to say about fifteen hundred—from Cesena. Later they came upon some more at Anzola, and these retired before them probably, or I should say certainly, under orders. At Spilimberto he had a personal brush with them, which resulted in a haphazard sort of success which he seems to have made no attempt whatever to push. A few days later, after investing Ferrara—the operation could not have been a very serious one, for it was only conducted for two and a half days—he attempted to storm the bridge-head at Occhiobello, but, finding it to be out of the question, left the array encamped on the spot and returned to Bologna, where he learned what had become of two legions of his Guard which he had sent to Tuscany—for no military reason that I have been able to discover, save the very problematical one of “rousing” the Tuscans. They were commanded by Generals Pignatelli, Strongoli, and Livron, who, being of equal rank, were to act in concert, but not to attempt to take precedence of each other—which, as one historian very truly says, was a “strange and unusual idea in the composition of the army.” These contrived to get as far as Pistoia, where, hearing that the garrison had designs upon them, they retired in something of a hurry to Florence. It was there that Joachim received a communication from Lord William Bentinck to the effect that, since he had broken his treaty with Francis, he could consider the treaty with England broken as well. He might well have expected this piece of information one would think, but it seems to have depressed him greatly. The King’s edicts, too, had fallen flat. They had produced, we are told, “promises, applause, poetic effusions, and popular orations, but neither arms nor action; thus furnishing much future work for the police, and nothing for war.” The forces he had counted upon did not materialise, and Joachim called his ministers together. These had discovered by now that he never called upon them for advice unless he was in trouble, and their ardour and loyalty were shaken. Still, when he laid the facts before them, they gave him the best they had, in the face of the rather desperate circumstances. The army was straggled out over a line between Reggio, Carpi, and Ravenna, without any supports or reserves, in the face of an enemy stronger, numerically and morally, and in their position one blow might be the end; so Joachim’s advisers recommended him to hold on to the places he had only so long as it would take to send back the sick and the baggage, and then look for some point of attack where the result would be a little less certain.