Japan -- History; Japan -- Politics and government
Mencius said people have this common saying--“The empire, the state,
the family. The root of the empire is the state--the root of the state
is in the family--the root of the family is in the person of its head.”
And Iyeyas seems to have recognized these principles as the foundation
of his rule, believing that when too much weight is given to the
state, despotism ensues; when the family preponderates, oligarchy of
an aristocracy prevails; and where the interests of the individual man
become paramount, democracy rears its head.
Those who framed the code were in all probability acquainted with the
writings of the Chinese sages and their commentators, and perhaps they
refer, in the allusions to Kamakura dono or Yoritomo, to some laws
laid down by him or his officers, who had more opportunity of studying
the Chinese writings than could fall to the lot of men who had been
brought up in the troublous times when Iyeyas was a youth.
The consideration of such laws laid down by Iyeyas, and which are more
or less still in force, leads to a comparison with the condition of
Europe during the time when feudal institutions were in force, the
genius of these laws being in many respects the counterpart of that
which was in force in Europe in feudal times. The constitution of
all warlike nations in early times has tended to this condition. The
discoveries of gunpowder and printing have been the great means of
breaking down this system; and in our day steam is rapidly breaking up
what these had left.
The man to whom had been given the most capacity for dealing with men
and for conducting war, was selected to take the command of those who
saw these qualities in him, and confided in his ability to prosecute
any undertaking to a successful termination. Of necessity such a man
must be a soldier. He must have the capacity to govern as well as to
fight; to make laws as well as to lead in battle; to conciliate men as
well as to control them. He divides the spoils among his followers,
allowing to each a proportion according to his merit.
A larger portion was retained by the chief, because, independently of
being able to appropriate it, he was to rule over all, and to incur
expenses on behalf of all in the general control of the acquired
territory.
This chief generally retained in his own hand certain privileges,
such as a more or less controlling voice in the legislature, power of
life and death, and of making peace or war and treaties of commerce,
coinage of money, right of property in mines of gold and silver, and
other rights. He had the power of conferring some of these on the
barons holding land from him and under him as superior. By subdivision
a feudal kingdom was cut up into many small but semi-independent
baronies. The execution of legal decisions became difficult, offenders
escaping to other jurisdictions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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