“Russia had pointedly and emphatically declared that she would not oppose any larger measure of liberty which the Congress might desire to secure to the provinces bordering on Greece. There was no symptom of any serious opposition from any other Powers. But England had deserted the cause of Greece, because they sold it to the Turks as part of the price to be paid for the island of Cyprus” (The Duke of Argyll’s, “The Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 170). Footnote 89: “Returning to Greece,” said Beaconsfield, “no one could doubt as to the future of this country. States, like individuals, which have a future, are in a position to be able to wait” (The Duke of Argyll’s “The Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 169). Footnote 90: The explanation of Lord Palmerston’s opposition to M. de Lessep’s scheme, which was given confidentially by him to one of his subordinates in the Foreign Office. Footnote 91: “We do not want Egypt, or wish it for ourselves any more than any rational man, with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south, would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post horses. We want to trade with Egypt, and to travel through Egypt” (Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Cowley, November 25, 1859). Footnote 92: _Pall Mall_, September 15, 1886. Footnote 93: “If Russia obtained Constantinople, she must cease to be barbarous before she could become formidable; and if she made a great navy, it must be by doing as the Venetians, the Dutch, the English, and the Americans did, by the accumulation of wealth, the exercise of industry, the superior skill and intelligence of her artizans” (Cobden’s Manchester Speech). Footnote 94: Carlo’s “British India,” p. 59. Footnote 95: Sir E. Thornton’s telegram from St. Petersburg. Footnote 96: Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857. Footnote 97: “Russia is divided into fifteen military districts, which comprise also Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, the Trans-Caspian region, and Turkestan. The entire Russian effective force, including officers, artillery, engineers, train, &c., consists of— Regular army 1,766,278 Cossack troops 145,325 Irregular troops 6,331 ————————— Total 1,917,934 ————————— By adding to these figures, the effective troops not levied in time of peace, say 100,000 men, we reach an effective of 2,000,000 for the war footing. The Russian militia, which may be called out in times of war, amounts to 3,000,000 men” (_Harper’s Magazine_, January, 1890), “The Russian Army” by a Russian General. Footnote 98: _The Times._