It is unnecessary to say that the representatives are not in theory regarded as delegates from their constituencies, and the local interests have not been found particularly engrossing. As to the practical position which the house occupies in the national life of the people--that is, as to the questions: What are the preponderant interests represented therein, and in what way; what have been the watchwords of the opposition, and how are the party lines drawn; how much has the existence of the house helped or hindered the progress of the nation during the past decade; what have been the effects of the continual struggle between the house and the government on the tactics and discipline of each, and which has shown the higher ability and greater continuity of purpose; and what have been the mutual effects of the action of the house and the more important domestic and foreign problems of the empire--these queries may be only imperfectly answered after the actual political history since the promulgation of the Constitution is thoroughly mastered. The more direct and practical question concerns the relation between the house or the diet in general and the cabinet. Is the latter responsible to the former for its political conduct? Perhaps nothing in the fundamental law of Japan can be of greater interest and importance than the question just stated, all the more so because the text of the Constitution and Marquis Itō's "Commentaries" on it, as well as his public utterances, seem, when closely examined, significantly to leave much room for future development. Nor are the eight changes of the cabinet which have taken place since the birth of the diet all of a character to decide this momentous question. "The respective ministers of state," says Article LV. of the Constitution, "shall give their advice to the emperor, and be responsible for it." What the last clause signifies is by no means made perfectly clear by the commentator, who says: "He alone can dismiss a minister, who has appointed him.... The appointment and dismissal of them [_i. e._, the ministers] having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of ministers is withheld from the diet. But the diet may put questions to the ministers and demand open answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses to the sovereign setting forth its opinions. Moreover, although the emperor reserves to himself in the Constitution the right of appointing his ministers at his pleasure, in making an appointment, the susceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into consideration. This may be regarded as an indirect method of controlling the responsibility of ministers. Thus, in the Constitution the following conclusions have been arrived at: