In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account, "when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference with respect to the _particular_ object or content judged."[211] It will be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a psychological analysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous system. FOOTNOTES: [173] _The Philosophical Radicals_, "Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory," p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the _Philosophical Review_, November, 1904. [174] Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have been reprinted in a volume entitled _Essays in Experimental Logic_, published by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are preceded, in this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and numerous alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the fundamental standpoint. [175] See James's review, "The Chicago School," _Psychological Bulletin_, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5. [176] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2. [177] Compare Dewey, _How We Think_ (1910), Chapter II, "The Need for Training Thought." [178] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 1. [179] _Ibid._, p. 2. [180] _Op. cit._, p. 3 f. [181] _Ibid._, p. 16. [182] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270. [183] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. x. [184] "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its development carries these along with it. There is, of course, such a thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f. [185] _Op. cit._, p. 15. [186] _Ibid._, p. 8. [187] _Op. cit._, pp. 18-19. [188] _Ibid._, p. 23. [189] _Ibid._, p. 17. [190] _Op. cit._, p. 23.