In opposition to the epistemologists, Dewey would consider the knowledge
relation not ubiquitous, but specific and occasional. As man bears other
relations to his environment than that of eater, so is he also something
more than a knower. "If the one who is knower is, in relation to
objects, something else and more than their knower, and if objects are,
_in relation to the one who knows them_, something else and other than
things in a knowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and
discuss...."[2] Dewey proposes to advance certain facts to support his
contention that knowing is "a relation to things which depends upon
other and more primary connections between a self and things; a relation
which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates
in their interests at specifiable crises."[257]
This brings the discussion back to familiar ground again, and nothing is
added to his previous statements of the functional conception of
knowledge. While the realist (explicitly or implicitly) conceives the
knowledge relation as obtaining between a subject knower and the
external world, Dewey interprets the knowledge relation in terms of
organism and environment. The 'ubiquity' of the knowledge relation is
disposed of, as has been seen, by conceiving knowledge from an entirely
different standpoint; by reducing all knowledge to inference, and
abolishing the knowing subject. Dewey is plainly under the impression
that the only alternative to the ubiquitous knower is his naturalistic,
biological interpretation of the processes of inference.
In support of his naturalistic logic, Dewey argues as follows: (1) All
perception involves reference to an organism. "We might about as well
talk of the production of a specimen case of water as a presentation of
water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk
about perceptions and the organism."[258] (2) Awareness is only a single
phase of experience. We 'know' only a small part of the causes which
affect us as agents. "This means, of course, that things, the things
that come to be _known_, are primarily not objects of awareness, but
causes of weal and woe, things to get and things to avoid, means and
obstacles, tools and results."[259] (3) Knowing is only a special phase
of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation, but very important as having
to do with means for the practical and scientific control of the
environment.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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