John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme CourtCorwin, Edward Samuel
History
John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme Court
Corwin, Edward Samuel
Constitutional history -- United States; Marshall, John, 1755-1835; United States. Supreme Court
The greater difficulty arose from the fact that, whether implied or
explicit, the contract before the Court was a public one. In the case of
private contracts it is easy enough to distinguish the contract, as the
agreement between the parties, from the obligation of the contract which
comes from the law and holds the parties to their engagements. But what
law was there to hold Georgia to her supposed agreement not to rescind
the grant she had made? Not the Constitution of the United States
unattended by any other law, since it protects the obligation only after
it has come into existence. Not the Constitution of Georgia as construed
by her own courts, since they had sustained the rescinding act. Only one
possibility remained; the State Constitution must be the source of the
obligation--yes; but the State Constitution as it was construed by the
United States Supreme Court in this very case, in the light of the
"general principles of our political institutions." In short the
obligation is a moral one; and this moral obligation is treated by
Marshall as having been converted into a legal one by the United States
Constitution.
However, Marshall apparently fails to find entire satisfaction in this
argument, for he next turns to the prohibition against bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws with a question which manifests
disapproval of the decision in Calder vs. Bull. Yet he hesitates to
overrule Calder vs. Bull, and, indeed, even at the very end of his
opinion he still declines to indicate clearly the basis of his decision.
The State of Georgia, he says, "was restrained" from the passing of the
rescinding act "either by general principles which are common to our
free institutions, or by particular provisions of the Constitution of
the United States." It was not until nine years after Fletcher vs. Peck
that this ambiguity was cleared up in the Dartmouth College case in
1819.
The case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward ¹ was a New
England product and redolent of the soil from which it sprang. In 1754
the Reverend Eleazar Wheelock of Connecticut had established at his own
expense a charity school for instructing Indians in the Christian
religion; and so great was his success that he felt encouraged to extend
the undertaking and to solicit donations in England. Again success
rewarded his efforts; and in 1769 Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire,
George III's representative granted the new institution, which was now
located at Hanover, New Hampshire, a charter incorporating twelve named
persons as "The Trustees of Dartmouth College" with the power to govern
the institution, appoint its officers, and fill all vacancies in their
own body "forever."
¹ The following account of this case is based on J. M. Shirley's
Dartmouth College Causes (St. Louis, 1879) and on the official report, 4
Wheaton, 518.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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