John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme CourtCorwin, Edward Samuel
History
John Marshall and the Constitution, a Chronicle of the Supreme Court
Corwin, Edward Samuel
Constitutional history -- United States; Marshall, John, 1755-1835; United States. Supreme Court
To the question whether the Constitution gave "any power to the Supreme
Court of the United States to reverse the judgment of the supreme court
of a State," Roane returned an emphatic negative. His argument may be
summarized thus: The language of Article III of the Constitution does
not regard the state courts as composing a part of the judicial
organization of the General Government; and the States, being sovereign,
cannot be stripped of their power merely by implication. Conversely, the
General Government is a government over individuals and is therefore
expected to exercise its powers solely through its own organs. To be
sure, the judicial power of the United States extends to "all cases
arising" under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. But
in order to come within this description, a case must not merely involve
the construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States; it
must have been instituted in the United States courts, and not in those
of another Government. Further, the Constitution and the acts of
Congress "in pursuance thereof" are "the supreme law of the land," and
"the judges in every State" are "bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." But
they are bound as state judges and only as such; and what the
Constitution is, or what acts of Congress are "in pursuance" of it, is
for them to declare without any correction or interference by the courts
of another jurisdiction. Indeed, it is through the power of its courts
to say finally what acts of Congress are constitutional and what are
not, that the State is able to exercise its right of arresting within
its boundaries unconstitutional measures of the General Government. For
the legislative nullification of such measures proposed by the Virginia
and Kentucky resolutions is thus substituted judicial nullification by
the local judiciaries.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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