January 13th. We marched at two p.m. about three miles out from camp, in the direction of the bridge of boats, erected by the Sikhs; when, after a little cannonading on both sides, we returned by six o'clock p.m. The object of such a movement was this, to try our rockets in the enemy's camp, and to ascertain the range of his guns. But, suppose we had found our enemy off his guard, that there were but few sentries, and no battery to defend the bridge on our side, our plan would then have been to destroy the bridge, and station a guard to prevent its reconstruction. The advantage of a pontoon bridge consists in your being able to place it at any part of the river. When Major-General Littler heard that the Sikhs were likely to cross, he sunk our pontoon bridge. And here I may be permitted to digress a little, to give some account of this pontoon bridge, which was made at Bombay. The Duke of Wellington, in 1803, ordered forty boats, each twenty-one feet in length, to be made at Bombay, and transported on a carriage with four wheels. This step was taken with a view to the operations of our army on the river Toombuddra against the Maharatta territory, and to enable him to cross and re-cross the river whenever he chose.[21] The Ferozepore pontoon bridge was sent thither in 1844. My object in mentioning this bridge is, that it forms an argument why the Sikhs expected us to attack them, for they said that the bridge of boats was a clear proof of our design. It is not a little singular, that in all the wars from 1803 to 1844, or for above forty years, the British had never used a pontoon bridge; none have ever been seen in the Delhi magazine. When opposite to Ramnuggur, in 1848, on the Chenāb, the Commander-in-Chief detached a large force to operate against the right flank of the Sikh army, it was found necessary to proceed twenty-five miles up the river, before this force could cross. Thus making a march of fifty miles before it came up with the enemy, and when ranged on the opposite bank, nearly in face of the British camp, that single division stood completely isolated, without the possibility of being supported in case of need. Whereas, had the army of the Punjaub possessed a pontoon train, this force might have crossed above the Sikh entrenchment, and been in a position to receive support from the main army. The Commander-in-Chief could easily have received prompt intelligence of their advance and progress, and instantly on hearing that they had engaged the enemy, transported his army across the ford, or, by means of a second pontoon train, he might have defeated Shere Singh's army at once, and deprived him of all his guns. The moral effect of an attack carried on under such circumstances is incalculable; the chances are that it would have decided the campaign.