Now, if we look at the map we shall see, that on the 28th, the day of the battle of Aliwal, the convoy would have been but a short distance south-west from Dhurmkote, perhaps twenty miles. And, again, if we suppose a line to be drawn from Dhurmkote, in a direction twenty miles to the south-east, which extreme point is called Bussean, we shall find that the Sikh troops at Buddiwal were very near to the convoy, on the night of the 27th of January. The escort for the convoy was extremely weak; for a corps of Native Infantry, and another of Native Cavalry, would not (after the late actions), have been above 1,200 men strong. This convoy was very inadequately protected, and such as our brave Commander-in-Chief would not have sent. Until joined by Taylor's brigade, from the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, it was in imminent danger. Had the Sikhs seized the convoy, the battle of Sobraon could not have taken place when it did; moreover, from delay, the season would have been sickly; and great loss must have ensued from this cause alone. There are some circumstances which occurred at the battle of Aliwal, deserving of prominent notice. The enemy had a great many guns, which were playing with considerable effect upon the British troops. Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Lawrenson, C.B., who commanded the Brigade of Horse Artillery, finding his men and horses falling, to save the delay of waiting for orders, instantly galloped up his brigade of guns to within a short distance of the Sikhs, wheeled round, unlimbered, and, by a brisk cannonade soon forced their gunners to quit their guns for a time. Had the cavalry charged at the same moment, I am assured they would have taken the guns. It was one of those exhibitions of decision and promptitude in war, which well merits, and did receive its reward. It was probably the suddenness of the movement which prevented the immediate support by troops. The Sikhs made a singular disposition of their infantry in this battle for receiving the charges of the British cavalry. Instead of forming in squares they were arranged into triangles, the apex being in front and opposed to the British, the men also in the rear, or base line, knelt down, so that when the 16th Lancers broke through the front face they were received by fixed bayonets. The French system was followed in these dispositions; and a few French officers were alone wanting to animate the enemy with hopes of success, however futile such hopes must have proved. For, opposed to a force commanded by one of our ablest and most experienced generals, nothing but ruin and utter destruction could, under any circumstances have fallen to the lot of our rash, though brave foe.