If then we speak of intellectual beauty or sublimity, these expressions are, _first_, not quite accurate, because beauty and sublimity are aesthetical modes of representation, which would not be found in us at all if we were pure intelligences (or even regarded ourselves as such in thought). _Secondly_, although both, as objects of an intellectual (moral) satisfaction, are so far compatible with aesthetical satisfaction that they _rest_ upon no interest, yet they are difficult to unite with it, because they are meant to _produce_ an interest. This, if its presentation is to harmonise with the satisfaction in the aesthetical judgement, could only arise by means of a sensible interest that we combine with it in the presentation; and thus damage would be done to the intellectual purposiveness, and it would lose its purity. The object of a pure and unconditioned intellectual satisfaction is the Moral Law in that might which it exercises in us over all mental motives _that precede it_. This might only makes itself aesthetically known to us through sacrifices (which causing a feeling of deprivation, though on behalf of internal freedom, in return discloses in us an unfathomable depth of this supersensible faculty, with consequences extending beyond our ken); thus the satisfaction on the aesthetical side (in relation to sensibility) is negative, _i.e._ against this interest, but regarded from the intellectual side it is positive and combined with an interest. Hence it follows that the intellectual, in itself purposive, (moral) good, aesthetically judged, must be represented as sublime rather than beautiful, so that it rather awakens the feeling of respect (which disdains charm) than that of love and familiar inclination; for human nature does not attach itself to this good spontaneously, but only by the authority which Reason exercises over Sensibility. Conversely also, that which we call sublime in nature, whether external or internal (_e.g._ certain affections), is only represented as a might in the mind to overcome [_certain_][54] hindrances of the Sensibility by means of moral fundamental propositions, and only thus does it interest.