SECOND DIVISION DIALECTIC OF THE AESTHETICAL JUDGEMENT § 55 A faculty of Judgement that is to be dialectical must in the first place be rationalising, _i.e._ its judgements must claim universality[99] and that _a priori_; for it is in the opposition of such judgements that Dialectic consists. Hence the incompatibility of aesthetical judgements of Sense (about the pleasant and the unpleasant) is not dialectical. And again, the conflict between judgements of Taste, so far as each man depends merely on his own taste, forms no Dialectic of taste; because no one proposes to make his own judgement a universal rule. There remains therefore no other concept of a Dialectic which has to do with taste than that of a Dialectic of the _Critique_ of taste (not of taste itself) in respect of its _principles_; for here concepts that contradict one another (as to the ground of the possibility of judgements of taste in general) naturally and unavoidably present themselves. The transcendental Critique of taste will therefore contain a part which can bear the name of a Dialectic of the aesthetical Judgement, only if and so far as there is found an antinomy of the principles of this faculty which renders its conformity to law, and consequently also its internal possibility, doubtful. § 56. _Representation of the antinomy of Taste_ The first commonplace of taste is contained in the proposition, with which every tasteless person proposes to avoid blame: _every one has his own taste_. That is as much as to say that the determining ground of this judgement is merely subjective (gratification or grief), and that the judgement has no right to the necessary assent of others. The second commonplace invoked even by those who admit for judgements of taste the right to speak with validity for every one is: _there is no disputing about taste_. That is as much as to say that the determining ground of a judgement of taste may indeed be objective, but that it cannot be reduced to definite concepts, and that consequently about the judgement itself nothing can be _decided_ by proofs, although much may rightly be _contested_. For _contesting_ [quarrelling] and _disputing_ [controversy] are doubtless the same in this, that by means of the mutual opposition of judgements they seek to produce their accordance; but different in that the latter hopes to bring this about according to definite concepts as determining grounds, and consequently assumes _objective concepts_ as grounds of the judgement. But where this is regarded as impracticable, controversy is regarded as alike impracticable.