which _Anaxagoras_ drew from empirical objects and their purposive combination. For in the very necessity of that which is purposive, and is constituted just as if it were designedly intended for our use,--but at the same time seems to belong originally to the being of things without any reference to our use--lies the ground of our great admiration of nature, and that not so much external as in our own Reason. It is surely excusable that this admiration should through misunderstanding gradually rise to the height of fanaticism. But this intellectual purposiveness, although no doubt objective (not subjective like aesthetical purposiveness), is in reference to its possibility merely formal (not real). It can only be conceived as purposiveness in general without any [definite] purpose being assumed as its basis, and consequently without teleology being needed for it. The figure of a circle is an intuition which is determined by means of the Understanding according to a principle. The unity of this principle which I arbitrarily assume and use as fundamental concept, applied to a form of intuition (space) which is met with in myself as a representation and yet _a priori_, renders intelligible the unity of many rules resulting from the construction of that concept, which are purposive for many possible designs. But this purposiveness does not imply a _purpose_ or any other ground whatever. It is quite different if I meet with order and regularity in complexes of _things_, external to myself, enclosed within certain boundaries; as, _e.g._ in a garden, the order and regularity of the trees, flower-beds, and walks. These I cannot expect to derive _a priori_ from my bounding of space made after a rule of my own; for this order and regularity are existing things which must be given empirically in order to be known, and not a mere representation in myself determined _a priori_ according to a principle. So then the latter (empirical) purposiveness, as _real_, is dependent on the concept of a purpose.