We have not yet advanced from moral Teleology to a Theology, _i.e._ to the being of a moral Author of the world, but only to a final purpose of creation which is determined in this way. But in order to account for this creation, _i.e._ the existence of things, in accordance with a _final purpose_, we must assume not only first an intelligent Being (for the possibility of things of nature which we are compelled to judge of as _purposes_), but also a _moral_ Being, as author of the world, _i.e._ a _God_. This second conclusion is of such a character that we see it holds merely for the Judgement according to concepts of practical Reason, and as such for the reflective and not the determinant Judgement. It is true that in us morally practical Reason is essentially different in its principles from technically practical Reason. But we cannot assume that it must be so likewise in the supreme World-Cause, regarded as Intelligence, and that a peculiar mode of its causality is requisite for the final purpose, different from that which is requisite merely for purposes of nature. We cannot therefore assume that in our final purpose we have not merely a _moral ground_ for admitting a final purpose of creation (as an effect), but also for admitting a _moral Being_ as the original ground of creation. But we may well say, that, _according to the constitution of our rational faculty_, we cannot comprehend the possibility of such a purposiveness _in respect of the moral law_, and its Object, as there is in this final purpose, apart from an Author and Governor of the world, who is at the same time its moral Lawgiver.