The result then is this. For the existence [Dasein] of the original
Being, as a Godhead, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, absolutely
no proof in a theoretical point of view is possible for the human
Reason, which can bring about even the least degree of belief. The
ground of this is quite easy to comprehend. For determining our
Ideas of the supersensible we have no material whatever, and we
must derive this latter from things in the world of sense, which is
absolutely inadequate for such an Object. Thus, in the absence of all
determination of it, nothing remains but the concept of a non-sensible
something which contains the ultimate ground of the world of sense, but
which does not furnish any knowledge (any amplification of the concept)
of its inner constitution.
§ 91. _Of the kind of belief produced by a practical faith_
If we look merely to the way in which anything can be _for us_
(according to the subjective constitution of our representative powers)
an Object of knowledge (_res cognoscibilis_), then our concepts will
not cohere with Objects, but merely with our cognitive faculties and
the use which they can make of a given representation (in a theoretical
or practical point of view). Thus the question whether anything is or
is not a cognisable being is not a question concerning the possibility
of things but of our knowledge of them.
_Cognisable_ things are of three kinds: _things of opinion_
(_opinabile_); _things of fact_ (_scibile_); and _things of faith_
(_mere credibile_).
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