Every interest spoils the judgement of taste and takes from its
impartiality, especially if the purposiveness is not, as with the
interest of Reason, placed before the feeling of pleasure but grounded
on it. This last always happens in an aesthetical judgement upon
anything so far as it gratifies or grieves us. Hence judgements so
affected can lay no claim at all to a universally valid satisfaction,
or at least so much the less claim, in proportion as there are
sensations of this sort among the determining grounds of taste.
That taste is still barbaric which needs a mixture of _charms_ and
_emotions_ in order that there may be satisfaction, and still more so
if it make these the measure of its assent.
Nevertheless charms are often not only taken account of in the case
of beauty (which properly speaking ought merely to be concerned with
form) as contributory to the aesthetical universal satisfaction; but
they are passed off as in themselves beauties, and thus the matter of
satisfaction is substituted for the form. This misconception, however,
like so many others which have something true at their basis, may be
removed by a careful definition of these concepts.
A judgement of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence
(although they may be bound up with the satisfaction in the
beautiful),--which therefore has as its determining ground merely the
purposiveness of the form,--is a _pure judgement of taste_.
§ 14. _Elucidation by means of examples_
Aesthetical judgements can be divided just like theoretical (logical)
judgements into empirical and pure. The first assert pleasantness or
unpleasantness; the second assert the beauty of an object or of the
manner of representing it. The former are judgements of Sense (material
aesthetical judgements); the latter [as formal[25]] are alone strictly
judgements of Taste.
A judgement of taste is therefore pure, only so far as no merely
empirical satisfaction is mingled with its determining ground. But this
always happens if charm or emotion have any share in the judgement by
which anything is to be described as beautiful.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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