beauty, but merely because it contradicts no condition, under which alone a thing of this kind can be beautiful. The presentation is merely correct.[38] We must yet distinguish the _normal Idea_ of the beautiful from the _Ideal_, which latter, on grounds already alleged, we can only expect in the _human_ figure. In this the Ideal consists in the expression of the _moral_, without which the object would not please universally and thus positively (not merely negatively in a correct presentation). The visible expression of moral Ideas that rule men inwardly, can indeed only be got from experience; but to make its connexion with all which our Reason unites with the morally good in the Idea of the highest purposiveness,--goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc.,--visible as it were in bodily manifestation (as the effect of that which is internal), requires a union of pure Ideas of Reason with great imaginative power, even in him who wishes to judge of it, still more in him who wishes to present it. The correctness of such an Ideal of beauty is shown by its permitting no sensible charm to mingle with the satisfaction in the Object and yet allowing us to take a great interest therein. This shows that a judgement in accordance with such a standard can never be purely aesthetical, and that a judgement in accordance with an Ideal of beauty is not a mere judgement of taste. EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL DERIVED FROM THIS THIRD MOMENT _Beauty_ is the form of the _purposiveness_ of an object, so far as this is perceived in it _without any representation of a purpose_.[39] FOURTH MOMENT OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE, ACCORDING TO THE MODALITY OF THE SATISFACTION IN THE OBJECT § 18. _What the modality in a judgement of taste is_