the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every Logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical. § 22. _The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement of taste is a subjective necessity, which is represented as objective under the presupposition of a common sense_ In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful, we allow no one to be of another opinion; without however grounding our judgement on concepts but only on our feeling, which we therefore place at its basis not as a private, but as a communal feeling.[40] Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience; for it aims at justifying judgements which contain an _ought_. It does not say that every one _will_ agree with my judgement, but that he _ought_. And so common sense, as an example of whose judgement I here put forward my judgement of taste and on account of which I attribute to the latter an _exemplary_ validity, is a mere ideal norm, under the supposition of which I have a right to make into a rule for every one a judgement that accords therewith, as well as the satisfaction in an Object expressed in such judgement. For the principle, which concerns the agreement of different judging persons, although only subjective, is yet assumed as subjectively universal (an Idea necessary for every one); and thus can claim universal assent (as if it were objective) provided we are sure that we have correctly subsumed [the particulars] under it. This indeterminate norm of a common sense is actually presupposed by us; as is shown by our claim to lay down judgements of taste. Whether there is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of Reason makes it only into a regulative principle for producing in us a common sense for higher purposes: whether therefore Taste is an original and natural faculty, or only the Idea of an artificial one yet to be acquired, so that a judgement of taste with its assumption of a universal assent in fact, is only a requirement of Reason for producing such harmony of sentiment; whether the “ought,” _i.e._ the objective necessity of the confluence of the feeling of any one man with that of every other, only signifies the possibility of arriving at this accord, and the judgement of taste only affords an example of the application of this principle: these questions we have neither the wish nor the power to investigate as yet; we have now only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements in order to unite them at last in the Idea of a common sense. EXPLANATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL RESULTING FROM THE FOURTH MOMENT The _beautiful_ is that which without any concept is cognised as the object of a _necessary_ satisfaction. GENERAL REMARK ON THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ANALYTIC