Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
thoughts, may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But the
question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense (the
soul according to empirical psychology) exist apart from my faculty of
representation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must
likewise be answered in the negative. And in this manner everything,
when it is reduced to its true meaning, is decided and certain. The
formal (which I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes
the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be nothing but a
form of my sensibility, it is as a representation in me just as actual
as I myself am, and nothing but the empirical truth of the
representations in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not
the case, if space and the phenomena in it are something existing
without us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception
can never prove the actuality of these objects without us.
II. The Cosmological Idea.{34}
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{34} Cf. Critique, Die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft.
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§ 50. This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most
remarkable curiosity. It serves as a very powerful agent to rouse
philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the
arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself.
I term this idea cosmological, because it always takes its object only
from the sensible world, and does not use any other than those whose
object is given to sense, consequently it remains in this respect in
its native home, it does not become transcendent, and is therefore so
far not mere idea; whereas, to conceive the soul as a simple
substance, already means to conceive such an object (the simple) as
cannot be presented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea extends
the connexion of the conditioned with its condition (whether the
connexion is mathematical or dynamical) so far, that experience never
can keep up with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always
an idea, whose object never can be adequately given in any experience.
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