Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future MetaphysicsKant, Immanuel
PhilosophyPhilosophy
Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Kant, Immanuel
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800; Metaphysics -- Early works to 1800
When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the totality of which
constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason, compelling
it to quit the mere contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible
experience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing (be it knowledge
or fiction) called metaphysics, I think I perceive that the aim of
this natural tendency is, to free our notions from the fetters of
experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so
far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the
pure understanding, which no sensibility can reach, not indeed for the
purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them (for there we
can find no ground to stand on), but because practical principles,
which, without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation
and hope, could not expand to the universality which reason
unavoidably requires from a moral point of view.
So I find that the Psychological Idea (however little it may reveal to
me the nature of the human soul, which is higher than all concepts of
experience), shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough,
and thereby deters me from materialism, the psychological notion of
which is unfit for any explanation of nature, and besides confines
reason in practical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the obvious
insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in
its lawful inquiry, serve in the same manner to keep us from
naturalism, which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally,
all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional, as it
always presupposes the dependence of things upon others, and
unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause
different from the world of sense. But as the causality of this cause,
in its turn, were it merely nature, could never render the existence
of the contingent (as its consequent) comprehensible, reason frees
itself by means of the Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a
blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, without a
first principle, and as a blind causality of this principle itself),
and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom, or of a
Supreme Intelligence. Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to
instruct us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of
Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus to afford scope
for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation. These
considerations, I should think, explain in some measure the natural
predisposition of which I spoke.
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