Kant's Theory of KnowledgePrichard, H. A. (Harold Arthur)
Philosophy
Kant's Theory of Knowledge
Prichard, H. A. (Harold Arthur)
Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804; Knowledge, Theory of
"But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not
by itself produce an image and a connexion of the impressions, unless
there were a subjective ground in virtue of which one perception, from
which the mind has passed to another, is summoned to join that which
follows, and thus whole series of perceptions are presented, i. e. a
reproductive power of imagination, which power, however, is also only
empirical."
"But if representations reproduced one another at haphazard just as
they happened to meet together, once more no determinate connexion
would arise, but merely chaotic heaps of them, and consequently no
knowledge would arise; therefore the reproduction of them must have a
rule, according to which a representation enters into connexion with
this rather than with another in the imagination. This subjective and
_empirical_ ground of reproduction according to rules is called the
_association_ of representations."
"But now, if this unity of association had not also an objective
ground, so that it was impossible that phenomena should be apprehended
by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible
synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would also be a pure accident
that phenomena were adapted to a connected system of human knowledge.
For although we should have the power of associating perceptions, it
would still remain wholly undetermined and accidental whether they
were associable; and in the event of their not being so, a multitude
of perceptions and even perhaps a whole sensibility would be possible,
in which much empirical consciousness would be met with in my mind,
but divided and without belonging to _one_ consciousness of myself,
which however is impossible. For only in that I ascribe all
perceptions to one consciousness (the original apperception) can I say
of all of them that I am conscious of them. There must therefore be an
objective ground, i. e. a ground to be recognized _a priori_ before
all empirical laws of the imagination, on which rests the possibility,
nay even the necessity, of a law which extends throughout all
phenomena, according to which we regard them without exception as such
data of the senses, as are in themselves associable and subjected to
universal rules of a thorough-going connexion in reproduction. This
objective ground of all association of phenomena I call the _affinity_
of phenomena. But we can meet this nowhere else than in the principle
of the unity of apperception as regards all cognitions which are to
belong to me. According to it, all phenomena without exception must so
enter into the mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of
apperception, which agreement would be impossible without synthetical
unity in their connexion, which therefore is also objectively
necessary."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account