latter it indicates a relation of the manifold _to us_, as being apprehended by us as the parts of the object. But two relations which, though they are of one and the same thing, are nevertheless relations of it to two different things, should not be referred to by the same phrase. Moreover, since the relatedness is referred to as relatedness to an object, the phrase properly indicates the relation of the manifold to an object, and not to us as apprehending it. Again, in the second place, Kant cannot successfully maintain that the phrase is primarily a loose expression for our consciousness of the manifold as related to an object, and that since this implies a process of synthesis, the phrase may fairly include in its meaning the thought of the combination of the manifold by us into a whole. For although Kant asserts--and with some plausibility--that we can only apprehend as combined what we have ourselves combined, yet when we consider this assertion seriously we see it to be in no sense true. [34] A. 109, Mah. 202. [35] B. 130, M. 80. [36] To say that 'combining', in the sense of making, _really_ presupposes consciousness of the nature of the whole produced, would be inconsistent with the previous assertion that even where the reality known is something made, the knowledge of it presupposes that the reality is already made. Strictly speaking, the activity of combining presupposes consciousness not of the whole which we _succeed_ in producing, but of the whole which we _want_ to produce. It may be noted that, from the point of view of the above argument, the activity of combining presupposes actual consciousness of the act of combination and of its principle, and does not imply merely the possibility of it. Kant, of course, does not hold this. The general conclusion, therefore, to be drawn is that the process of synthesis by which the manifold is said to become related to an object is a process not of knowledge but of construction in the literal sense, and that it leaves knowledge of the thing constructed still to be effected. But if knowing is obviously different from making, why should Kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making? Three reasons may be given. In the first place, the very question, 'What does the process of knowing consist in?' at least suggests that knowing can be resolved into and stated in terms of something else. In this respect it resembles the modern phrase '_theory_ of knowledge'. Moreover, since it is plain that in knowing we are active, the question is apt to assume the form, 'What do we _do_ when we know or think?' and since one of the commonest forms of doing something is to perform a physical operation on physical things, whereby we effect a recombination of them on some plan, it is natural to try to resolve knowing into this kind of doing, i. e. into making in a wide sense of the word.