[12] The drift of the passage would seem to be this: 'If we are to present to ourselves an instance of a quantity, we must successively combine similar units until they form a quantity. This process involves the thought of a successive process by which we add units according to the conception of a quantity. This thought is the thought of number, and since by it we present to ourselves an instance of a quantity, it is the schema of quantity.' But if this be its drift, considerations of sense demand that it should be rewritten, at least to the following extent: 'If we are to present to ourselves an instance of a _particular_ quantity [which will really be a particular number, for it must be regarded as discrete, (cf. B. 212, M. 128 fin., 129 init.)] e. g. three, we must successively combine units until they form _that_ quantity. This process involves the thought of a successive process, by which we add units according to the conception of _that_ quantity. This thought is the thought of a particular number, and since by it we present to ourselves an instance of _that_ quantity, this thought is the schema of _that_ quantity.' If this rewriting be admitted to be necessary, it must be allowed that Kant has confused (_a_) the thoughts of particular quantities and of particular numbers with those of quantity and of number in general respectively, (_b_) the thought of a particular quantity with that of a particular number (for the process referred to presupposes that the particular quantity taken is known to consist of a number of equal units) and (_c_) the thought of counting with that of number. [13] This statement is, of course, not meant as a definition of counting, but as a means of bringing out the distinction between a process of counting and a number. [14] For the thought of a number is the thought of a quantity of a special kind, viz. of a quantity made up of a number of similar units without remainder.