Khartoum Campaign, 1898; or the Re-Conquest of the SoudanBurleigh, Bennet
History
Khartoum Campaign, 1898; or the Re-Conquest of the Soudan
Burleigh, Bennet
Omdurman, Battle of, Omdurman, Sudan, 1898; Sudan -- History -- 1881-1899; Sudan -- History, Military
"M. Marchand is in want of ammunition and supplies, and any that
may be sent to him must take months to arrive at their
destination. He is cut off from the interior, and is quite
inadequately provided with water transport. Moreover, he has no
following in the country, and nothing could have saved his
expedition from being annihilated by the dervishes if we had been
a fortnight later in crushing the Khalifa."
The gist of this despatch was communicated to the French Government,
accompanied by a notification that the Sirdar's "language and
proceedings" had the complete approval of Lord Salisbury. M. Delcasse
was evidently at his wits' end to escape from an _impasse_ which was
chiefly of his own creation.
In an interview with Sir E. Monson on September 27 he wished to put
off a final decision till he had received the despatches which M.
Marchand had forwarded in duplicate by way of the French Congo and
Abyssinia respectively.
"To gain time, M. Delcasse," writes our Ambassador, "wished that I
should request your lordship to consent to a telegram being sent
by the French agent at Cairo to Khartoum, to be forwarded from
thence up the Nile to Fashoda. The telegram would contain
instructions to M. Marchand to send at once one of the French
officers serving on his mission to Cairo with a copy of his
above-mentioned report, so that the French Government might learn
its contents as soon as possible. They were, of course, ready to
bear all the expense.
"Stress was laid by M. Delcasse upon the great desire entertained
at Paris to prevent any serious difficulty from arising; at the
same time, he felt convinced, especially in view of the conduct of
the Sirdar at Fashoda, acting as he undoubtedly was under
instructions, that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as the
French Government to avoid a conflict.
"I told M. Delcasse in reply that I must conclude from the
language which he had held that the French Government had decided
that they would not recall M. Marchand before receiving his
report, and I asked if I was right in this conclusion. I pointed
out to his Excellency that M. Marchand himself is stated to be
desirous of retiring from his position, which appeared to be a
disagreeable one. Such being the case, I must urgently press him
to tell me whether he refused at once to recall M. Marchand.
"After considering his reply for some few minutes, his Excellency
said that he himself was ready to discuss the question in the most
conciliatory spirit, but I must not ask him for the impossible.
"I pointed out that your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst.,
which I had communicated to him at the time, had made him aware
that Her Majesty's Government considered that there could be no
discussion upon such questions as the right of Egypt to Fashoda."
To this Lord Salisbury replied next day:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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