The action of Russia upon the Yalu River at the present time, her action in respect of Won-san in the past, are each animated by this _motiv_. Russia regards Korea as the completion of her dominions in the Far East, while Japan looks upon the little kingdom as the corollary to that expansion which is essential to the existence of the Island Empire. Russia in Manchuria and Korea, with her shadow projected over China, would mean a sentence of perpetual restriction and shrinkage for Japan. But, similarly, Russia from her position at Vladivostock and Port Arthur must regard the occupation of Korea by Japan as a wedge with its point projected towards the centre of her Manchurian communications. Just as, therefore, the fear of a Russian descent upon Korea has excited Japan, the necessity for such action has brought the crisis in the relations between Japan and Russia so perceptibly nearer. Private agreements and secret overtures have paved the way for the _denouement_ which long since was disclosed. When Russia endeavoured to requisition the harbour of Ma-san-po for the requirements of her Pacific Squadron, an indication was afforded that Russian activity in Korea would be concealed no longer. Ma-san-po has since become an open port, the Government of Japan at once formulating ingenious objections to the Russian scheme at the same time that they threatened the Government of Korea with threats of immediate reprisals. But prior to the conditions laid down by Russia in the Ma-san-po Convention of 1900 with the Korean Government, this magnificent harbour had already attracted the attention of the Japanese and Chinese settlers. By force of circumstances, therefore, the place became an open port, the local authorities being powerless to check the influx of foreigners and the creation of a foreign zone around the harbour. That M. Pavloff, the clever Russian diplomatic representative in Seoul, succeeded in bringing about any agreement at all is remarkable, taking into account the panic-stricken state to which the Imperial Government was reduced by Japanese intimidation. The secret convention between the Russian and Korean Governments, entered into during 1900, preserved the independence of the harbour, and, failing to confirm Russia in the definite occupation of Ma-san-po, provided that none of the land about Ma-san-po harbour or its approaches should be permanently ceded or sold to any foreign Power. The same conditions applied to the island of Keu-chai, situated in the mouth of the harbour. This curtailment of the ambitions of Russian policy, in this particular direction, due, of course, to the energetic action of Japan, did not make the position of Russia in Ma-san-po in any sense secure. Japan, even then upon the eve of her declaration, would have gone to war with Russia, if that Power had attempted to maintain an isolated and complete domination of this harbour and its approaches against her wishes.