Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
In the South African War a disaster to a Convoy at _Sannah's Post_, or
_Koorn Spruit_ (March 31, 1900), was caused by the absence of
precautions in front of a retreating force, the wagons being permitted
to enter a defile (the Spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was
held by the Boers) before the exit had been secured. Earlier in the
same campaign a Convoy of 800 wagons was lost at _Ramdam_ (February 13,
1900). An ambushed force of Boers killed all the transport animals and
the wagons were abandoned. No escort had been provided for the Convoy,
which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance.
Throughout the South African War the activities of De Wet emphasised
the vulnerability of the Lines of Communications.
Where the tactical situation permits, arrangements should be made to
protect the Lines of Communications by offensive action. An engagement
may be invited in a suitable position, the protecting troops holding
the raiders with a Delaying Action while reinforcements are summoned to
converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and
exterminating the raiders.
{119}
THE REAR GUARD
A Rear Guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the
stragglers, to keep off marauders, and to prevent surprise by an
energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the
rear of the advancing column.
But its most important work is the protection of a retreating force,
and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise
of the enemy and the spirit and determination of the force that is
being pursued. Generally speaking, Rear Guard fighting against an
unexhausted enemy is the most difficult and most dangerous of all
military enterprises. When a Rear Guard halts to fight it is being
separated every minute from the Main Body, which is moving away from
it, while every minute brings reinforcements to the enemy. The work
requires great tactical skill, as it is the duty of the commander to
delay pursuit by occupying positions from which he withdraws at the
last moment, without becoming involved in a general engagement, from
the meshes of which it may be necessary for the Main Body to return and
extricate him. The work also requires great moral courage, as it is
the duty of the commander to risk the loss of his force if by so doing
he is adopting the only means of saving the Main Body.
STRENGTH.--The strength of the Rear Guard will depend upon the energy,
strength, and closeness of the pursuit, the condition of the Main Body
(and whether it is withdrawing voluntarily or upon compulsion after an
unsuccessful engagement) and upon the nature of the country, but it
will generally amount to not less than {120} one-fifth or more than
one-third of the whole force, and will be selected, as a rule, from
those who have been least severely engaged.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account