Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
I. The best line for the establishment of a series of mutually
supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry.
{143}
II. The best means of protecting the flanks.
III. The best position for the artillery and machine guns.
IV. The tactical key to the position.
V. The line from which attack may be expected.
VI. The best line for the counter-attack.
VII. The positions for the supports and reserves.
and, additionally, in the case of a War of Manoeuvre:--
VIII. The best position for the cavalry.
IX. Alternative positions in rear from which, after
reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best
line of withdrawal to them.
Additional information would be required in Position Warfare as to the
best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position,
and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against
attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.).
{144}
NIGHT OPERATIONS
There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in
certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement,
and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air
Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements
being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except
marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the
main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps
must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to
prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of
subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those
officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the
position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is
absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive
spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of
intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is
reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn
it!"
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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