Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
THE ATTACK ON WOODS.--The opening stages of the attack on a wood
resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer
fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field
of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak
points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under
these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending
troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is
necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while
advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close
range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops
in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine
guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support,
the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160}
stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the
flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards,
while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements
reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During
the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917)
_Tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and
were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _Gauche Wood_,
acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th
Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they
reached the outskirts of _Villers Guislain_ they were forced to
withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to
the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the _Battle of Messines_
(June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance
by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally
speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the
many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is
limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of
approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood
"reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the
flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on
account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept,
to avoid loss of direction. In the _advance from the captured
position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have
established a fire position within close range it may only be possible
to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or
neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear
edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from
both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against
the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in
the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct
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