Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
THE CAVALRY.--The opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend
upon the character of the defensive operations. Against a highly
organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted
troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre. Before the
attack during an "Encounter Battle" the cavalry will have been out on
reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they
may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action, and by local
counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry
disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed
to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful assault the
Pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the
enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements,
to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications.
Generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a
flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force.
"Cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of
all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at
_Appomattox_ or _Paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of
Grand Tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to
attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (Henderson). In the
Mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of General Sir S. Maude's
forces on September 27-29, 1917, against the Turkish forces assembling
near _Ramadie_, 65 miles north-west of Baghdad, was converted into the
surrender of the Turkish commander and about 4,000 all arms by the
enveloping tactics of the Anglo-Indian Cavalry Division. A similar
manoeuvre on March 26, 1918, by the cavalry of the Mesopotamian Field
Force (commanded at that time by General Sir W. R. Marshall, {65} who
succeeded after General Maude's death from cholera), resulted in the
surrender of over 5,000 Turks, including a divisional commander, 22
miles north-west of Hit. The prisoners were fugitives from the battle
of _Baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications.
"On the morning of the Armistice (November 11, 1918) two British
Cavalry Divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before
orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line 10 miles in
front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the
advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's
disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches). The absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often
decided the issue of a campaign. After the action of _Gaines's Mill_
(June 27, 1862) General J. E. B. Stuart was dispatched by Lee with the
Confederate cavalry on a false scent to White House, south of the York
River, to which base Lee believed McClellan to be retreating. But
McClellan had shifted his base to Harrison's Landing, on the James
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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