Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
River, and the Confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the Army
of the Potomac until July 3, two days after the failure of Lee's attack
on Malvern Hill. Had Stuart been available with his cavalry throughout
that critical period McClellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy
prey to the Confederate horsemen, and the roads through the forests and
swamps to Malvern Hill could have been blocked. Absence of cavalry
before the first day of _Gettysburg_ (July 1, 1863) hampered the
Confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with
unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before
them. General Stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding
expedition. After the victorious attack of General Early's division a
handful of General Buford's U.S. cavalry enabled the defeated 1st Corps
of Meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. A
thousand {66} Confederate sabres would have brushed Buford aside, and
July 1 would have been disastrous to the National cause.
During the German offensive of March-July, 1918, "even two or three
well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the
French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to
have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's
Dispatches). During the _Battle of Cambrai_ (November 20, 1917) a
squadron of the Fort Garry Horse crossed the Scheldt Canal, and after
capturing a German battery and dispersing a large body of infantry,
maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when
it withdrew to the British lines with its prisoners. During the
_Battle of Amiens_ (August 8-18, 1918) the cavalry were concentrated
behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first
day of the battle they advanced 23 miles from their position of
assembly. Throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and
valuable service. During the Second _Battle of Le Cateau_ (October
6-12, 1918) cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his
retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the
railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire
from Cattigny Wood and Clary "a dashing charge by the Fort Garry Horse
gained a footing in Cattigny Wood and assisted our infantry to press
forward. Further east, Dragoon Guards and Canadian Cavalry were
instrumental in the capture of Hennechy, Reumont, and Troisvilles" (Sir
D. Haig's Dispatches). In the early stages of the campaign in _North
Russia_ (August-September, 1918) a handful of cavalry on either bank of
the North Dwina River could have kept the Bolshevik forces constantly
on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of
their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing
infantry was unable to accomplish. A few squadrons of cavalry could
have dispersed the whole {67} Bolshevik force in the Archangel
Province.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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