Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local
reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the
flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined
counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.
_The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack_ and is held
for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force,
in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main
attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only
when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the
decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute
counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success.
But the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to
the General Reserve alone_. Commanders of sections of the defence who
are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the
decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have
been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for
the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This
opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it.
Every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the
opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "To
initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for
preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure,
with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("Field Service
Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
That the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the
battle of _Spottsylvania_ (May 12, 1864). General Hancock's Corps
(from Grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of Lee's
entrenchments in the Wilderness of Virginia; 20,000 men had assaulted
and captured the Salient, taking 4,000 prisoners; they then pressed
forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into
the Confederate position. "But Lee, recognising the weakness of the
Salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed
about half a mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were
suddenly brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had
intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could
neither make their orders {94} heard nor form their men for another
rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tremendous counter-attack.
Every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the
vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these 20,000 men were
driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the
Confederates recaptured their first position" (Henderson).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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