The Advanced Guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously engaged, and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with the known intentions of the commander of the Main Body. The tendency to independent action of this kind, which militates against the success of the best laid plans, was very observable in the early battles of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Actions were hastily entered on by Advanced Guards, maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival of reinforcements, and finally concluded with barren results and losses in excess of those inflicted. At the _Battle of Spicheren_ (August 6, 1870) the Advanced Guard of the 14th Prussian Division commenced the battle, which had to {109} be sustained for three hours by 11 battalions against 39. During the next three hours 8 more battalions arrived, and at the conclusion of the battle only 27 battalions and 10 batteries in all had come into action against a whole French Corps, and there were two French Corps within reach of the one engaged. Had these "marched to the sound of the cannon," as Napoleon would have marched, the 14th Prussian Division would have been unable to extricate itself without complete disaster. At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870) the Prussian Crown Prince had expressed his intention not to engage the French on that day. Yet the Advanced Guard of the V. Corps brought on a battle into which the Bavarian Corps was perforce drawn. The Crown Prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had to be sent into action. Although tactically successful the battle was out of accord with the settled plans of the Commander-in-Chief. In the same way the Advanced Guard of the VII. Prussian Corps, contrary to the letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the I. Army, precipitated an action at _Colombey_ (August 14, 1870). Other troops were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the I. Army was engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had expressly forbidden. The battle had no tactical or strategical results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "Precipitate action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most advantageous manner. For when a small force is engaged against a larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively where an effective blow may be struck. Thus the direction of the fight is surrendered to the enemy, as at Spicheren and Colombey. The French positions were so strong that the German {110} reinforcements as they arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical.