I. Man, we find, is endowed with a self-acting power of will, which is called mental liberty, and hence he is accountable. For although it is admitted that there cannot be a volition without a motive, yet it is an idea inseparable from our notions of mental liberty, that there cannot be any thing in these motives necessitating the volition; for in that case it would not be free. But he is free to adopt either the right or the wrong motive of volition, and therefore he is accountable for his actions. Nor does it follow that this liberty confers the _right_ to do _wrong_. His liberty, as we have shown, is to be understood in a sense agreeing with the coincident ideas of _right_ and _duty_. We are all conscious, that so soon as we perceive _the good_, in any case, we have a feeling of _obligation_ to observe it as the rule of conduct, and to avoid the contrary as _wrong_; that is, _each man has a conscience_. Hence, although man has the _power_ to do wrong, he has no _right_ to do wrong; but only a _right_ to do that which is good. Such, and such only, is the true subjective _right of self-control_. It is not a right to do as we may please, unless we shall please to do that which, in itself, is _right_; that is, _the good_. II. His fall, we have seen, has had the effect to place him in such circumstances, that the attributes of his lower nature, his appetites, propensities, and passions, often have such ascendency as motives of action, that he is always liable to do wrong. Many reasons, _à priori_, could be given for this. The mind is first brought into contact with the outward world through the bodily senses. They come first into play; and hence the natural sensibilities are first developed. The will, in the form of spontaneous volition, is accustomed, from earliest life, to act from these as a motive, for the reason that there is no other from which it can act. The pure intelligence, the percipient of the good, and the corresponding feelings of obligation, unfold themselves slowly; and long before it may be said that the mind is matured, the will is accustomed to make the natural sensibilities the motive of spontaneous volition. Now the will is, like all other faculties of the mind, subject to the great law of habit; and if not checked, restrained according to the true idea of government, a _habit_ of submission is formed, which, if not early dissolved, becomes a confirmed habit. The will, instead of being the governing power of the mind, becomes, in truth, the faculty governed. _It has lost the power of self-control._ It has become the slave of passion--confirmed in the habit of submission. It is precisely at this point of mental degradation that Paul declares of “vessels of wrath,” those who have brought themselves into this state by their own act, that “they are fitted to destruction.” Now, in view of these facts and the principles already established, what are the rights of man?