Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
the other planets were known to be subject, and to predict its place in
the heavens, at any time, according to this law, we should be said to
form a theory of its motions; as we should not take for granted, any
new quality of a substance, or the existence of any substance, which
was not evidently present, but only of _tendencies_ observed before in
other circumstances,--analogous indeed, but not absolutely the same.
We should be said to form an hypothesis on the subject, if, making
the same prediction, as to its motions, and place in the heavens, at
any given time, we were to ascribe the centripetal tendency, which
confines it within its orbit, to the impulse of ether, or to any other
mechanical cause. The terms, however, I must confess, though the
distinction which I have now stated would be, in all cases, a very
convenient one, are used very loosely, not in conversation merely, but
in the writings of philosophers,--an hypothesis often meaning nothing
more than a theory, to which we have not given our assent,--and a
theory, an hypothesis which we have adopted, or still more, one which
we have formed ourselves.
A _theory_, then, even in that best sense, to which I wish it
accurately confined, as often as it ventures a single hair-breadth
beyond the line of former observation, may be wrong, as an hypothesis
may be wrong. But, in a theory, in this sense of it, there are both
less risk of error, and less extensive evil from error, than in an
hypothesis. There is less risk of error, because we speak only of the
properties of bodies, that must be allowed actually to exist; and the
evil of error is, for the same reason, less extensive, since it must be
confined to this single point; whereas, if we were to imagine falsely
the presence of some third substance, our supposition might involve as
many errors, as that substance has qualities; since we should be led
to suppose, and expect, some or all of the other consequences, which
usually attend it, when really present.
The practical conclusion to be drawn from all this very long
discussion, is, that we should use hypotheses to suggest and direct
inquiry, not to terminate or supersede it; and that, in theorizing,--as
the chance of error, in the application of a general law, diminishes,
in proportion to the number of analogous cases, in which it is observed
to hold,--we should not form any general proposition, till after as
wide an induction, as it is possible for us to make; and, in the
subsequent application of it to particulars, should never content
ourselves, in any new circumstances, with the mere probability, however
high, which this application of it affords; while it is possible for us
to verify, or disprove it, by actual experiment.
FOOTNOTES:
[30] On the Powers of the Human Mind, Essay vi. Chap. viii. Vol. II. p.
334. 8vo. _edit._
[31] Traite des Systemes, chap. xii. Vol. II. p. 372.
[32] Travels, Part iv, chap. 8. Swift's Works, _edit._ Nichols, Vol.
ix. p. 300.
LECTURE IX.
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