Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
If our knowledge of matter be relative only, our knowledge of mind
is equally so. We know it only as susceptible of feelings that have
already existed, and its susceptibilities of feelings which have not
arisen, but which may, in other circumstances, arise, we know as
little, as the blind can be supposed to know of colours, or as we,
with all our senses, know of the qualities which matter might exhibit
to us, if our own organization were different. Of the _essence_
of mind, then, we know nothing, but in relation to the states or
feelings that form, or have formed, our momentary consciousness. Our
knowledge is not absolute but relative; though, I must confess, that
the term _relative_ is applied, in an unusual manner, when, as in
the present instance, the relative and correlative are the same. It
is unquestionably the same individual mind, which, in intellectual
investigation, is at once the object and the observer. But the noble
endowment of memory, with which our Creator has blessed us, solves
all the mystery of this singular paradox. In consequence of this one
faculty, our mind, simple and indivisible as it truly is, is, as it
were multiplied and extended, expanding itself over that long series
of sensations and emotions, in which it seems to live again, and to
live with many lives. But for memory, there can be no question that
the relation of thought to thought could not have been perceived; and
that hence there could have been no philosophy whatever, intellectual
or moral, physical or metaphysical. To this wonderful endowment, then,
which gives us the past to compare with the present, we owe that
most wonderful of relations, of which the same being is at once the
_object_ and the _subject_, contemplating itself, in the same manner,
as it casts its view on objects that are distant from it, comparing
thought with thought, emotion with emotion, approving its own moral
actions, with the complacency with which it looks on the virtues of
those whom it admires and loves, in the most remote nation or age, or
passing sentence on itself, as if on a wretch whom it loathed, that was
trembling with conscious delinquency, under the inquisition of a severe
and all-knowing judge.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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